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Abstract—Why do legal permanent migrants return to their home countries? How do 
home country conditions influence this decision? This paper uses exogenous home 
country exchange rate shocks arising from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to distinguish 
return motivations of a national sample of Australian immigrants. On average, a 10% 
favorable exchange rate shock (a depreciation in the home country currency) leads to a 
reduced likelihood of return of 0.37 percentage points for migrants. The effect is found to 
be stronger for those who had pre-existing intentions to return, weaker for those 
undecided, and zero for those who initially stated their desire to stay. These results favor 
a life-cycle explanation for migrant behavior and reject the theory that migrants are target 
earners who seek to invest upon return home. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Many individuals who live and work outside their countries of birth eventually return 
home. While the official government statistics are lacking, indirect estimates from 
different countries over time suggest considerable flows: Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) 
report that over 20 percent of immigrants chose to re-migrate from the US in the 1970s. 
Dustmann (2007) approximates that 40% of all male immigrants and 55% of female 
immigrants left the UK after five years of arriving in the 1990s. Most recently, Gibson 
and McKenzie (2011) find that over a quarter of the “best and brightest” students who 
ever migrated from three pacific countries ultimately end up returning (33% in Tonga, 
27% in Papua New Guinea, and 26% in New Zealand). 
 
 Why do migrants return? To traditional economic models that emphasize income 
maximization (such as Sjaastad 1962 or Harris and Todaro 1970), migrant return is a 
puzzle. If migrants indeed permanently move to where they earn the most, yet income 
differentials between countries rarely reverse, then these models predict little or no return. 
This does not seem to conform to reality. More nuanced theories appeal to other 
considerations like the inclination to invest or consume at home by migrants. These 
models rationalize the decision to return without requiring a reversal in wages between 
sending and receiving countries. More importantly, these theories allow for marginal 
changes in home country conditions to matter for a migrant’s behavior. 
 
 Two competing models are at the forefront: those that see migrants as target 
earners or life-cycle agents. In the former, individuals are credit constrained, so they 
move abroad in order to accumulate enough savings to finance an enterprise upon 
returning home (as in Piore 1979 and Mesnard 2004). The primary motive for return is 
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investment. In the latter, migrants weigh the marginal benefits of obtaining higher income 
in the host country versus the marginal costs of remaining overseas, since home country 
consumption is preferred (see for instance Stark et al. 1997 or Dustmann 2003). The goal 
upon return is to consume. The two have separate predictions on how migrants respond to 
home country factors. For example, target earners are thought to cut their stays abroad 
shorter when their purchasing power for the home country increases while life-cycle 
migrants react by making their stays longer2.  
 
 Distinguishing between the two is of interest because, as some assert, return 
migrants may contribute greatly to general economic prosperity. Migrant sending 
countries, for example, often lament losing their highly skilled nationals to richer 
countries through international migration, pejoratively calling this a “brain drain.” Return 
migration is seen as a reverse to this loss, as migrants bring back essential human capital 
acquired from abroad. In addition, returnees are thought of as potential investors, with 
relatively large amounts of savings accumulated from abroad and who may generate 
entrepreneurial activity at home. While there are good reasons to believe these occur, it is 
unclear whether return migrants behave this way in practice. The last scenario, for 
instance, is only more likely if return migrants are target earners instead of life-cycle 
migrants. Moreover, policymakers looking to enact measures to encourage return may 
benefit from learning what motivates returnees. Target earners will be more responsive to 
programs that promote better access to credit markets while lifecycle migrants will be 
less so. 
 
 The empirical investigation for reasons of migrant return related to home country 
considerations is scant and limited to particular contexts. An obvious reason is the lack of 
data that track migrants’ locations over time but an additional and important 
consideration is the difficulty of isolating exogenous variation in factors that affect return, 
which limits the ability to make causal inference. Most studies look at correlations. 
Constant and Massey (2002), for instance, relate covariates of social and economic 
attachments in the home country with migrant return and find that these are strongly 
associated for a sample of German guest workers. Dustmann (1996) similarly finds that 
for Italian, Spanish, Yugoslavian, Turkish, and Greek migrants residing in Germany in 
1984-1993, having a partner residing in the home country increases the probability that 
they intend to go home. Investigating purchasing power parity, Kirdar (2010) 
demonstrates that German immigrants shorten their stays overseas when their purchasing 
power rises in their home countries. The chief concern in these studies is omitted variable 
bias, as source country attachments are possibly endogenous to other unobservable 
factors, such as innate ability and entrepreneurial mindset, which may also affect the 
individual’s propensity to return. 
 
 Yang (2006) perhaps comes closest to identifying the causal impact of changing 
home country conditions on return. Alleviating concerns about endogeneity, the author 
utilizes an unexpected event, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when substantial and 
varied exchange rate shocks were realized between the Philippine peso and foreign 
currencies. Now Filipino migrants worked in a diverse set of countries abroad so it was as 
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if each of them were randomly allocated different exchange rate shocks during this time. 
By comparing the behavior of Filipino migrants who attained greater or smaller shocks, 
the paper establishes how exchange rates affected the decision of these migrants to return 
home. The finding is that Filipino migrants are primarily driven by life-cycle 
considerations, prolonging their stay abroad when they experience favorable changes in 
their purchasing power at home. Since his sample is mostly composed of short-term 
Filipino migrants in temporary work contracts though, it is unclear whether the 
conclusion should hold for other types of migrants as well, such as those granted 
permanent legal status and are joined by other family members in the host country. For 
this set of individuals, a reasonable prior in fact is that there could be no motivation for 
return at all. 
 
 This paper focuses on Australian permanent immigrants and their motivations for 
return. I employ a strategy similar to Yang (2006) in using exchange rate shocks brought 
about by the Asian Financial Crisis, except I look at a mirror image: data from one 
destination country on immigrants from multiple origin countries. As opposed to 
observing one source country whose migrants were located in different destinations, this 
has the added advantage of capturing not only transnational households, but also a sample 
whose whole households have migrated. In addition, the dataset identifies current migrant 
economic status and activities. Australia is an ideal context to study migration because it 
is a large immigrant country with 24.7% of its population foreign-born. Most of these 
immigrants are legal permanent residents whose immediate relatives are already present 
in the host country. 
 
 The main contribution is the finding that a 10% increase in the exchange rate, a 
home country currency depreciation, leads to a 0.37 percentage point reduction in the 
probability that a migrant returns3. The 2-year permanent return rate in this period is 
small at 4.1% so this effect is almost equivalent to a considerable 10% of the return rate. 
That these migrants continue to be sensitive to home country conditions is a somewhat 
surprising result, given that these individuals are granted permission for indefinite stay in 
Australia. The result is robust and consistent with the story that migrants return due to 
life-cycle considerations. A substantially larger effect is found for migrants who have 
pre-determined that they would want to return, evidence that migrants optimally time 
their return to favorable conditions. Moreover, I show evidence that this exchange rate 
shock effect is not merely a proxy for the influence of other macroeconomic conditions, 
such as GDP per capita growth or the change in unemployment in the home country. This 
suggests that return is primarily a function of purchasing power and consumption rather 
than employment possibilities in the origin country. 
 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the life 
cycle and target earnings models of return migration; the third part reviews the Asian 
Financial Crisis and its effects on Australia; the fourth describes Australian migration 
policy and the data; the fifth outlines the empirical strategy and results; the sixth presents 
robustness checks; and finally, the last part concludes. 
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II. Theoretical Framework 
 
 What can responses to exchange rate shocks tell about the motivations of migrants 
to return? In this section, I present the life cycle and target earnings models of return 
migration patterned substantially after the ones presented by Dustmann (2003) and 
Mesnard (2006). To save space, I provide abridged versions of these models but highlight 
the role played by exchange rate variation in a migrant’s choice of her optimal migration 
duration. Readers interested in a fuller treatment are encouraged to consult the 
aforementioned articles. 
 
 Consider a migrant, who currently resides in a foreign country (Australia in this 
case) at time 0 and whose lifespan extends until time 1. To make things simple, assume 
that there is no discounting between periods, the interest rate equals zero, and each 
individual has perfect foresight. Hence, given preferences for foreign and home 
consumption, 𝑢!(𝑐!)  and 𝑢!(𝑐!) , a migrant maximizes her lifetime utility by 
concurrently choosing the amount of consumption in the foreign country 𝑐!, consumption 
at home 𝑐!, and her duration of stay abroad 𝑡, where 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 1. Assume that prices are 
normalized to 1 in both countries. Further, migrants favor consumption at home than 
consumption abroad. 
 
 There are two types of migrants: lifecycle consumers who are only capable of 
being wage earners at home4, and target earners whose goal abroad is to accumulate 
resources in order to invest in a small business at home. Wages per period abroad for 
both types is given by 𝑤!. Savings from these wages can be converted to home country 
currency through an exchange rate 𝐸  expressed as home country currency over the 
currency abroad. Upon return, lifecycle migrants work for a wage 𝑤! per period. Target 
earners however may opt instead to invest in a business that provides a high-income 
stream of 𝑦 and 𝑦 > 𝐸𝑤! > 𝑤!. Self-employment cannot be done simultaneously with 
working for a wage. In addition, starting a business requires collateral, 𝐶, which can only 
be financed through savings abroad due to credit constraints both abroad and at home. 
This difference between life-cycle consumers and target earners allows deriving 
conditions such that the two are distinguishable from their response to exchange rate 
shocks to their home country currencies. 
 
IIA. Lifecycle Consumers 
 
The maximization problem for a lifecycle consumer is as follows: 
 max!!  !!  ! 𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) 𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑡𝑐! + 𝑆! ≤ 𝑡𝑤!                                                                  (1) 1− 𝑡 𝑐! ≤ 1− 𝑡 𝑤! + 𝐸𝑆!                (2) 
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where (1) and (2) are the budget constraints for the periods spent abroad and at home 
respectively. 𝑆! represents accumulated savings up to time 𝑡. Let us consider for the 
moment only interior solutions. Note that for an interior solution to hold, (1) and (2) are 
satisfied with equality and (2) can be substituted into (1) for 𝑆! .  
 
 The first order condition of the corresponding Lagrangian with respect to 𝑡 is 
given by (3) where 𝜆 is the marginal utility of wealth: 
 𝑢! 𝑐! − 𝑢! 𝑐! + 𝜆 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! = 0         (3) 
 
This result is fairly intuitive. The migrant balances the marginal cost of remaining abroad 𝑢! 𝑐! − 𝑢! 𝑐!  due to the preference to consume at home, with the marginal benefit of 
earning higher abroad represented by the term 𝜆(𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝑐!). 
 
 The more interesting part though is how the solution to 𝑡∗ evolves in response to a 
shock in 𝐸. The details of this solution are relegated to the appendix but they closely 
follow the derivation of Mesnard (2004). Equation (4) describes the response 
 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝐸 = 𝑤! − 𝑐! − 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝐸 −𝑏𝜆 + 𝑎𝑡𝑎!                       (4) 
 
where (𝑤! − 𝑐!) ≥ 0  and 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝐸 < 0  because of a first order condition, 𝑏 = 𝐸𝑡 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆 +1− 𝑡 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆 , and 𝑎 = − 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! . Since the marginal utility of wealth is 
positive and it can be shown that 𝑏 < 0 and 𝑎 ≤ 0, the response to a favorable (positive) 
change to the exchange rate depends on two effects. First, a substitution effect, !!"!! > 0, 
induces the migrant to stay longer abroad, but an opposing income effect, !"!! < 0, 
encourages the migrant to cut their stay abroad short because of the higher spending 
power permitted at home by an increase in E. While the total effect is ambiguous, the 
overall result if the substitution effect turns out to dominate the income effect is that 
migrants prolong their stay in the foreign country due to a favorable exchange rate shock. 
This prediction allows us to identify life-cycle consumers because, as I will show in the 
next part, target earners do not quite respond to the same exchange rate shock in the same 
manner. 
 
IIA. Target Earners 
 
The corresponding optimization problem for a target earner is as follows: 
 max!!  !!  ! 𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) 𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑡𝑐! + 𝑆! ≤ 𝑡𝑤!                                                                                      (5) 1− 𝑡 𝑐! ≤ 1− 𝑡 𝑦 + 𝐸𝑆! − 𝐶                        (6) 𝐸𝑆! ≥ 𝐶                                                                                                                  (7) 
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Consider here once again only an interior solution such that (5), (6), and (7), hold with 
equality. In particular, note that at the optimum, 𝐸𝑆! = 𝐶, where a migrant stays abroad 
only up to the point where her target savings are met. This makes sense; otherwise there 
is no point delaying return until 𝐸𝑆! > 𝐶 since investment at home fetches greater per 
period income 𝑦 than 𝑤!  and consumption at home is preferred. Also consider the other 
possibility that the collateral C needed to start up a business is so high that it cannot be 
financed by accumulated savings even when the migrant stays abroad until the end of his 
life (𝑤! < 𝐶). Here, the migrant will simply revert to acting like a lifecycle consumer 
and solves the corresponding optimization problem. 
 
 The solution is straightforward and the details are left to the appendix. The first 
order condition that describes the optimal choice of 𝑡 is given by (8). 
 𝑢!! 𝑤! − 𝐶𝐸𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑢! 𝑤! − 𝐶𝐸𝑡 − 𝑢! 𝑦 = 0                      (8) 
 
Consequently, the change in 𝑡∗ that results from a change in the exchange rate amounts to 
 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝐸 = − 𝑡𝐸                                                                   (9) 
 
This is always negative. Hence, for target earners, a favorable exchange rate shock leads 
to an unambiguous shorter stay abroad. 
 
 To summarize, if the motivation of migrants for return is mostly to invest, then we 
should expect their response to a favorable exchange rate shock to shorten their stays 
abroad. Observing otherwise allows us to reject this target earnings model in favor of one 
where migrants are dominated by life-cycle considerations and the concern is primarily 
consumption at home. In such a model, migrants lengthen their stays abroad at the onset 
of a favorable exchange rate shock if the substitution effect dominates the income effect. 
However, it is of course plausible that the return decisions of migrants do not at all 
respond to exchange rate shocks, in which case migrants may not actually prefer 
consumption at home (a starting assumption) or that the solution to the above models are 
at the corner and 𝑡∗ = 1. These observations inform the interpretation of the results that 
will come from the empirical section, where I provide evidence that legal permanent 
migrants in Australia are likely to be life-cycle consumers and do in fact respond to home 
country considerations. 
 
 
III. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and its Impact on Australia 
 
 Although some observers had hinted at the possibility of some crash5, the crisis 
that eventually beset the booming East and Southeast Asian economies of the 1990s is 
largely regarded to have been unexpected. There were few signals. In fact, as Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) note, macroeconomic fundamentals remained sound in these countries: 
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savings rates were high; inflation was low; and fiscal accounts were generally balanced. 
Credit agencies such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s gave no indication of changing 
risk in these countries’ ratings until after the crisis had begun. 
  
 The Asian Financial Crisis is credited to have officially started in July 1997 with 
the devaluation of the Thai baht. This singular event triggered a wave of capital flight 
from the region as foreign investors withdrew their funds, speculating on the weakness of 
surrounding economies. The five countries most affected were Thailand, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The statistics tell the story: In 1996, the year 
before the crisis, these countries enjoyed inflows of foreign capital worth $97.1 billion in 
total. In just a year, this reversed to an outflow estimated to be $18.1 billion (Radelet and 
Sachs 1999). This was followed by currency devaluations, which were not only confined 
to the hardest hit. Other countries in the region such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Laos also suffered economic losses, albeit less so. What economic analysts had 
previously dubbed as the “Asian Economic Miracle” had come to an end. 
 
 For the most part, Australia came out of the episode unscathed. Diminished 
regional demand for its exports was briefly a concern, but while this did subsequently 
decline (Gunawardana 2006), the impact on the local economy was negligible. In fact, 
real GDP continued to grow by 4.0% during 1997-98, up from 2.8% in the previous 
period; unemployment fell from 8.7% to 8.3%; and private consumption and business 
investment rose by 4.6% and 11.6% respectively from the previous year (Queensland 
Annual Economic Report). Makin (1999) attributes the resilience to international capital 
being switched from Asian markets to Australasia, North America, and Western Europe, 
helping keep interest rates low and asset values high in these advanced economies. 
 
 This study takes advantage of the simple fact that immigrants in Australia come 
from a variety of countries, each of whom experienced different home country shocks 
during this event, embodied by the exchange rate changes that occurred between their 
home country currency and the Australian dollar. Australia was relatively unaffected and 
migrants presumably faced the same local economic conditions while in the country yet 
had their home country currencies appreciate or depreciate to varying degrees. Hence, to 
understand what motivates migrants to return, an approach would be to observe which 
immigrants were more likely to return home by comparing the behavior of those who 
were faced with more positive or more negative home country exchange rate shocks. 
 
 Figure 1 depicts the exchange rate fluctuations that occurred during the Asian 
financial crisis between the Australian dollar and foreign currencies of the top 15 home 
countries of migrants in Australia. The exchange rates are expressed as foreign currency 
over Australian dollar (e.g. PHP/AUD) and are normalized to 1 in January 1, 1996 for 
ease of comparison. An increase (decrease) represents foreign currency depreciation 
(appreciation) with respect to the Australian dollar; it signifies a higher (lower) 
purchasing power for the migrant looking to come home. It is apparent that a structural 
break in the trends occurs around July 1, 1997, the start of the crisis. Variation around 
this period is what this study exploits. 
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IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  
 I employ data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA1), 
a nationally representative study of principal immigrant applicants issued permanent 
visas offshore and arrived in Australia between 1993 and 1995.6  This panel was 
conducted in three waves of interviews and I focus on the 2nd and 3rd waves, which were 
implemented from 1995-1997 and 1997-1999 respectively. This nicely corresponds to 
years prior to and after the Asian Financial Crisis. The main sample thus consists of 3069 
principal immigrants aged 15 to 60 years old, who have identifiable countries of birth and 
historical exchange rate data available for their origin countries.  
  
 As part of its migration program, the Australian government allocates permanent 
visas under five broad categories: the Preferential Family, Concessional Family, Business 
Skills and Employer Nomination Scheme, Independent, and Humanitarian. The labor 
market has always played a crucial role in this structure. Applicants under the 
independent and concessional family streams are subject to a points test, where they are 
allocated points by satisfying criteria deemed in demand by the Australian labor market 
(such as age, education, experience, English language ability, etc.). Visa eligibility is 
determined by passing a predetermined threshold of points. Employment Nomination is 
reserved for firms sponsoring workers. On the other hand, Business Skills are granted for 
entrepreneurs who have invested a certain amount of capital in the country. The 
Preferential Family and Humanitarian visa streams are the only categories that do not 
depend on economic circumstances. The former is reserved for close relatives of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The survey excludes New Zealanders, who comprise majority of immigrant inflows to Australia. 
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Figure 1: Foreign Exchange Rates of the Top 15 Home Countries of Immigrants 
in Australia 
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Australian citizens or permanent residents while the latter are for refugees and their 
family members. The number of visas issued per year is capped. For 1993-1994, the total 
number granted for all streams was 76,870 (Phillips et al. 2010). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Immigrants 
Panel A: Immigrant Characteristics (N=3069) Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Prop. Male 0.57    
Age 32.72 8.59 15 60 
     
Marital Status     
     Married 0.72    
     Never Married 0.24    
     Separated 0.01    
     Divorced 0.02    
     Widowed 0.01    
     
Highest Formal Qualification     
     Higher Degree 0.12    
     Post Graduate Diploma 0.06    
     Bachelor’s Degree 0.24    
     Technical/Professional Qualification 0.23    
     Trade 0.07    
     12 or more years of schooling 0.13    
     10-11 years of schooling 0.06    
     7-9 years of schooling 0.05    
     6 or fewer years of schooling 0.03    
     
Visa Classification     
     Preferential Family 0.45    
     Concessional Family 0.18    
     Business Skills & Employer Nomination 0.13    
     Independent 0.20    
     Humanitarian 0.05    
 
Panel B: Household Characteristics (N=3069) Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Household Size 3.53 1.85 1 14 
Number of Household Members in Home Country     
     0 0.60    
     1 0.27    
     2 0.07    
     3 0.03    
     4 0.01    
     5 0.01    
     
AUD value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 26,332 94,439 0 1,100,000 
     
Average weekly income7     
     None 0.09    
     $1 to $57 per week 0.05    
     $58 to $96 per week 0.03    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 To minimize missing observations, I construct average weekly income by taking the max between the average weekly income of the 
primary applicant and the spouse. This is an imperfect measure of household income although all the following regressions are robust 
to using average income only of the principal applicant. Alternate measures that the LSIA provides include total household income or 
total weekly income from all sources but these contain too many missing observations. 
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     $97 to $154 per week 0.10    
     $155 to $230 per week 0.09    
     $231 to $308 per week 0.07    
     $309 to $385 per week 0.07    
     $386 to $481 per week 0.10    
     $482 to $577 per week 0.10    
     $578 to $673 per week 0.07    
     $674 to $769 per week 0.05    
     $770 to $961 per week 0.07    
     $962 or more per week 0.11    
     
Household Sent Money Overseas to Relatives/Friends 0.20    
     
Place of Residence     
     New South Wales 0.43    
     Victoria 0.23    
     Queensland 0.11    
     South Australia 0.05    
     Western Australia 0.12    
     Tasmania 0.02    
     Northern Territory 0.01    
     A.C.T 0.03    
 
Panel C: Other Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Return Rate 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Exchange Rate Shock 0.10 0.29 -0.29 3.10 
GDP per capita (in USD, PPP) $13,977 $11,353 $472 $67,170 
 
     
 Table 1 describes the resulting composition of immigrants in the main sample. 
Those that come are young (aged 33), typically married, with relatively good education 
(42% have at least a bachelor’s degree). The most common channel through which 
individuals obtained visas was through family sponsorship and they initially arrive with a 
significant amount of funds, over 25,000 AUD on average. Interestingly, majority of 
these principal applicants declare typical household members to be already present with 
them in Australia by 1995-1997. 60% of households do not have members left in their 
home countries. This number becomes 71% if one only considers close relatives (spouse, 
son, or daughter) that remain. In addition, only 20% said that they sent money to relatives 
or friends overseas in the course of the past 2 years. 
 
 Migrants to Australia come from a diverse set of countries. Table 2 presents the 
tabulation of individuals from the top 15 source countries in the sample. England is the 
primary source with 281 individuals, but countries are fairly evenly represented. Asian 
countries most affected by the 1997 crisis (Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
the Philippines) take up a considerable share of the top 15. 
 
 For the analysis, migrants are assigned exchange rate shocks by calculating the 
change in their home country exchange rate that occurred in the period between their 
wave 2 and wave 3 interviews.8 Consistent with Yang (2006), I use nominal instead of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Specifically, I compute the average exchange rate a year prior to a migrant’s interview date in wave 2 and correspondingly for wave 
3 then calculate the percentage change between periods by subtracting the log values of the former from the latter. Alternatively, 
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real exchange rates since data on the former are available daily, allowing for the 
exchange rate changes for each observation to be calculated exactly prior to and after 
interview dates. Daily historical exchange rates were obtained online from Oanda 
Corporation.9 The exchange rates for each country are uniformly expressed in home 
country currency over Australian dollars such that an increase represents a depreciation 
of the home currency while a decrease signifies an appreciation with respect to the 
Australian dollar. Increases in the exchange rate can be thought of as favorable to 
immigrants since it raises the foreign currency value of their earnings and savings when 
utilized for home country consumption. 
 
Table 2: The Top 15 Source Countries with Mean Exchange Rate Changes Experienced 
Origin country n % of sample % cumulative 
mean exchange 
rate change 
England 281 9.16 9.16 -0.08 
Hong Kong 187 6.09 15.25 -0.05 
China (excluding Taiwan) 153 4.99 20.23 -0.07 
India 145 4.72 24.94 0.08 
Philippines 126 4.11 29.06 0.14 
South Africa 121 3.94 33.01 0.18 
United States of America 105 3.42 36.43 -0.04 
Japan 78 2.54 38.97 0.16 
Lebanon 78 2.54 41.51 -0.10 
Malaysia 74 2.41 43.92 0.14 
South Korea 73 2.38 46.30 0.24 
Indonesia 72 2.35 48.65 0.72 
Turkey 72 2.35 53.27 1.12 
Germany 70 2.28 55.33 0.08 
Thailand 63 2.05 57.25 0.20 
Other 1371 44.67 100 0.08 
Total 3069 100 100 0.10 
 
 How were country currencies of migrants affected by the Asian financial crisis? 
The fifth column of table 2 reports the calculated mean exchange rate shocks experienced 
by individuals from origin countries going from wave 2 to 3 of the survey. On average, 
countries experienced depreciation in their currencies of 0.10 (10 percent) with respect to 
the Australian dollar but the spread is large with a standard deviation of 0.2 and a number 
of countries also saw their currencies appreciate. There were some countries that 
experienced extreme depreciations with Bulgaria having its currency depreciate by 310%, 
Turkey by 112%, and Romania by 98%. I continue to include migrants from these 
countries in my sample for lack of any non-arbitrary rule with which to exclude them, but 
I conduct robustness checks later showing that my results do not rely on including or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
computing exchange rate shocks by simply calculating the change in the exchange rates between waves 2 and 3 at the exact day the 
migrants were interviewed does not change the results in the analysis. For migrants who were not interviewed in wave 3 and were 
therefore not assigned an interview date, I assume a most likely interview date. This is taken from the interview group they belonged 
to and I use the mean interview date of that group. 
9http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ 
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excluding these migrants. The highly varied exchange rate shocks make this period 
appropriate to consider in investigating the effect of exchange rates on return. While 
conceding that the financial crisis was a highly unusual event, the shocks were 
unexpected during this period, hence, plausibly exogenous (an assumption I more 
carefully investigate later on), minimizing usual concerns about omitted variable bias. In 
addition, substantial variation in the exchange rates allow for more accurate estimation 
that cannot typically be done when looking at exchange rate changes in normal times. 
 
 The main outcome variable of interest is return migration captured by an attrition 
indicator. Enumerators noted the reasons a respondent could not be interviewed in a 
particular wave, as described in table 3. Since the baseline interview obtained contact 
details for friends and relatives most likely to know where interviewees were for future 
waves, the study was able to track whether individuals left permanently for overseas. I 
use “Overseas Permanently” as the indicator for return, assuming that this accurately 
reflects return migration. All individuals registered as having moved overseas 
permanently had their spouses in this status as well, so this may well be interpreted as 
potentially whole households returning. This is distinct presumably from “Overseas 
Temporarily” which more aptly describes visits home or trips to other countries, although 
redoing the whole analysis considering this too as an indicator for return does not change 
results.  
 
 Obviously, measuring return migration in this way could present some issues due 
to measurement error. For instance, permanently overseas could mean that the migrant 
moved to another country overseas instead of back to the home country. In a later section, 
I discuss implications of such threats and present robustness checks to verify that results 
are insensitive to relaxing measurement error assumptions. 
 
Table 3: Main reasons for sample attrition 
Reason Description 
Unable to Track Address information not current or inadequate. Migrant was not 
contacted and current location unknown 
Refused Migrant refused interview. 
Overseas Temporarily Information given that migrant has left Australia for the scheduled 
interview period, but intends to return to Australia 
Overseas Permanently Information given that migrant has left Australia and does not 
intend to return. 
Out of area Migrant settled in area too distant from capital city to be 
economically viable to interview. 
Other Migrant too sick to interview, deceased, other reasons. 
 
 
V. Empirical Results 
 
 The main equation I estimate is as follows: 
 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" + 𝛽!Δ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!" + 𝜀!"           (10) 
 
	   13	  
where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!" is a dummy indicating whether migrant i from country c returned 
between waves 2 and 3 of the survey and Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" is the percentage change in home 
country exchange rate between interviews.  𝛽! is the coefficient of interest, indicating the 
effect of a 1% increase in exchange rates on the probability of return. Since the number 
of years between interviews varied per migrant, I account for this by including Δ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆!", 
although this is typically two for most. 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!" are year dummies which indicate when 
the interview for wave 2 was conducted for migrant i. This is either 1995, 1996, or 1997 
and allows for time trends in migrant return. 𝜀!" is the disturbance term which is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!". In all regressions, I cluster standard errors at the 
country level to allow 𝜀!" to be correlated between individuals with the same origin 
country. 
 
 One might still worry about potential omitted variables in this specification. In 
particular, certain migrant households might just happen to have been differently 
impacted by the Asian Financial crisis in a way that is correlated with both their 
exchange rate shock and return. This is a violation of the exogeneity assumption and 
biases the estimate of 𝛽!. Hence, I estimate an augmented equation (11) that includes, 𝑿𝒊𝒄, 
a vector of controls for migrant and household characteristics recorded pre-crisis for each 
individual (refer to Panel A and B of Table 1 again for this list of covariates). I also 
include country of origin variables that incorporate information on common language and 
colonial history with Australia, distance from Sydney, GDP per capita, and indicators for 
whether the country is included in the list of those hardest hit by the Asian financial 
crisis.10 
 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" + 𝛽!Δ𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅!" + 𝜷𝟓𝑿𝒊𝒄 + 𝜀!"           (11) 
 
If Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!" is indeed exogenous, then the estimate of 𝛽! should be unaltered by the 
addition of controls. To the extent that these controls also help explain return migration, 
their inclusion should make estimates of 𝛽!  more precise. 
 
Main Result 
 
 The results are as follows: Table 4 produces estimates of 𝛽! using OLS. The 1st 
column begins with a specification that uses no control variables but I progressively 
introduce a set of country of origin, household, and migrant characteristics as covariates. 
The exchange rate shocks are generally negatively related to the probability of return. 
When Column 2 includes the log of GDP per capita of the migrant’s origin country, the 
estimated impact of exchange rates on return diminishes but remains negative and 
statistically significant. This turns out to be an important control variable since migrants 
from richer countries are more likely to return but also happened to experience more 
negative exchange rate shocks (an appreciation in their currencies) than poorer countries 
during the financial crisis.11 Accounting for this, however, does not completely overturn 
the result. The negative estimate remains robust to including a host of additional controls 
on country of origin, household, and migrant characteristics in columns 3, 4, and 5. There 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These are taken from Mayer and Zignago (2011) and the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
11 The correlation between ΔlnERATE and ln(GDP per capita) is -0.18.	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is no evidence that certain types of individuals or households were impacted differentially 
by the financial crisis in Australia in a way that is correlated with their experienced 
exchange rate shocks. 
 
Table 4: The Effect of Exchange Rate Shocks on Permanent Return Migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ΔlnERATE -0.0512*** -0.0380*** -0.0366*** -0.0389*** -0.0373*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00948) (0.0109) (0.00988) (0.0104) 
      
ln(GDP per capita of origin country)  0.0172*** 0.0161*** 0.0139*** 0.0155*** 
  (0.00321) (0.00340) (0.00396) (0.00441) 
      
Other Country of Origin controls N N Y Y Y 
Household controls N N N Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls N N N N Y 
N 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 
R2 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.027 0.028 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” (assumed here to have 
returned to country of origin). 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa 
upon admission, state of residence, average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
 
 Overall, the results indicate that a 10% increase in the exchange rate leads to a 
0.37 percentage point decline in the probability that a migrant returns. This is not trivial, 
provided that a standard deviation change in the exchange rate during the period was 0.29 
and the permanent return rate of migrants was small at 4.1% of the sample. The effect is 
equivalent to almost accounting for a tenth of the return rate. This suggests that 
households of migrants in Australia remain sensitive to home country conditions. They 
seem to be dominated by life-cycle considerations more than target earnings motives for 
return; that is, when exchange rates increase and the migrants’ foreign wages and savings 
increase in value with respect to home country currencies, they stay longer at the 
destination. This is similar to the finding of Yang (2008) for his sample of overseas 
Filipino migrants, mostly temporary contract workers abroad with family members 
remaining behind. That this effect more generally holds for a sample of immigrants in 
Australia is a new finding. These are immigrants who hold permanent residence status 
and hold the option to stay, but they appear to remain influenced by home country 
considerations. 
 
Differential Effects By Intention to Return 
 
 Next, I investigate whether this effect of the exchange rate shocks varies 
depending on the subgroup considered. I present evidence that the influence of exchange 
rates mostly operate on immigrants who had decided beforehand that they would like to 
return, but also that undecided individuals were persuaded to return by exchange rate 
changes, albeit with lesser impact. LSIA1 asked individuals at the baseline survey, prior 
to the crisis, whether they intended to return to their home countries sometime in the 
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future. Possible answers were: yes, no, and not sure. I look at whether the exchange rate 
shocks had different impacts between individuals with different answers to this question. 
To do this, I re-estimate equation (2) with interaction terms for intention to return and the 
exchange rate shocks. Table 5 below presents the results with different specifications that 
include or leave out certain controls, while always controlling for country of origin 
variables, including log GDP per capita which has been found to be important. In these 
regressions, those who had no intention to return are the reference group. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, those who were unsure or stated their desire to return at the onset 
were more likely to return in wave 3 versus those that said they did not want to return. I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that changing exchange rates had no effect on those that 
said they do not plan to return. On the other hand, favorable exchange rate shocks to 
migrants seem to have considerably delayed the return of those who expressed desire to 
do so. The effect is smaller but still statistically significant for those who were unsure of 
return at the beginning. This is evidence that migrants optimally time their return but also 
that home country conditions have some influence at the extensive margin of whether 
they eventually decide to return or not among those who are unsure. 
 
Table 5: The Effects of Exchange Rate Shocks By Intention of Return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Intend to Return=NOT SURE 0.0555*** 0.0502*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0103) 
    
Intend to Return=YES 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0425) 
    
ΔlnERATE -0.0119 -0.0151 -0.0130 
 (0.0106) (0.00942) (0.0157) 
    
(ΔlnERATE)*(Intend to Return=NOT SURE) -0.0625*** -0.0551*** -0.0568*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0184) 
    
(ΔlnERATE)*(Intend to Return=YES) -0.233*** -0.225*** -0.224*** 
 (0.0757) (0.0747) (0.0748) 
    
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y 
Household controls N Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls N N Y 
N 3069 3069 3069 
R2 0.050 0.057 0.057 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is a dummy indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” (assumed here to have returned to 
country of origin). 
Intend to Return is an indicator variable that captures the immigrant’s response to the question in wave 2, “Do you intend to return to 
your home country?” Possible answers were: ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘not sure.’ 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon 
admission, state of residence, average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
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 In regressions not shown, I also investigate differential effects of the exchange 
rates depending on the migrant’s pre-crisis income levels or their country of origin GDP 
per capita. The coefficient estimates are imprecise but generally show that increases in 
exchange rates are accompanied by a reduced likelihood of return for all income 
categories and country of origin GDP per capita. There do not appear to be differential 
effects on these dimensions. 
 
Are Exchange Rate Shocks Merely a Proxy for Other Macroeconomic Variables? 
 
Table 6A: Are the Exchange Rate Shocks Merely Capturing the Effect of Other Changing Macroeconomic 
Variables in the Home Country? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ΔlnERATE -0.0483***   -0.0440*** -0.0469*** -0.0438*** 
 (0.0124)   (0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0115) 
       
ΔlnGDPPCAPITA  0.175*  0.0928  0.0838 
  (0.0995)  (0.0966)  (0.0896) 
       
ΔUNEMPLOYMENT   -0.00241  -0.0013 -0.0005 
   (0.0025)  (0.0024) (0.0024) 
       
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 
R2 0.037 0.036 0.032 0.037 0.033 0.033 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” (assumed here to have 
returned to country of origin). 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, 
average weekly income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
 
 A concern about the previous regressions might be that the exchange rate shocks 
merely proxy for other macroeconomic shocks that also occurred in the home countries 
during the financial crisis. In other words, since exchange rate changes were potentially 
correlated with variation in GDP per capita growth, unemployment, or prices then it 
could be these variables influencing return and not the higher purchasing power resulting 
from the fluctuations in the exchange rates. A direct test then would be to include these 
other macroeconomic variables in estimating the main regression equations and observe 
if the impact of the exchange rate changes. Table 6A displays the results of implementing 
this analysis using different ways of including GDP per capita growth and changes in 
unemployment in the home country between waves 2 and 3. Table 6B does the same for 
changes in prices as computed from the CPI.12 I use only observations without missing 
values in all these indicators to hold the sample constant across regressions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Because data on GDP per capita, unemployment, and CPI are only provided as yearly averages, I cannot compute the 
change in these variables that occurs exactly between interview dates for the migrants, in the same way I did for the 
exchange rate for which daily data was available. I settle for using a weighted measure in calculating the changes for 
	   17	  
 
 Overall, the main result is insensitive to the inclusion of changes in GDP per 
capita or unemployment in Table 6A. Column 1 replicates the main regression for the 
smaller sample. In column 2, higher GDP per capita growth in the home country appears 
to increase the likelihood that migrants return, but this effect disappears once the 
exchange rate shock is accounted for. In column 3, home country unemployment is 
unrelated to return. The last three columns drive home the point that no matter how you 
include these other macroeconomic variables as controls, the effect of the exchange rate 
shocks on return is robust. Notice though that there might be more to this finding: these 
regressions suggest that migrant return is better explained by purchasing power and 
consumption than by employment opportunities and prospects at home. In all regressions, 
exchange rate changes are the most important determinant of return. This goes against the 
usual perception that migrants return because of a booming home country economy. 
 
Table 6B: Are the Exchange Rate Shocks Merely Capturing the Effect of Other Changing Macroeconomic 
Variables in the Home Country? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ΔlnERATE -0.0393***  -0.0418 
 (0.0103)  (0.0281) 
    
ΔlnCPI  -0.0361*** 0.00312 
  (0.0116) (0.0312) 
    
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y 
N 3080 3080 3080 
R2 0.032 0.031 0.031 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” (assumed here to have 
returned to country of origin). 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, 
average weekly income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
 
 Table 6B shows how changes in the general price level in the home country are 
related to return. Column 1 is again a replication of the main result while column 2 shows 
that changes in prices demonstrates about a similar effect on return as much as the 
exchange rate shocks. Including both variables in the same regression in column 3 keeps 
the point estimate for the effect of the exchange rate shock unchanged but precision is 
lost (it is now significant only at the 14% level), while it reverses the sign for the effect of 
a price change and estimates it to virtually be zero. I interpret this as evidence of price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
these variables. For instance, if a migrant was interviewed on March 1995 for 2nd wave, I assign her country’s GDP per 
capita on that date as ¼ the value of the measure for that year’s plus ¾ the value of the previous year’s. I then do the 
same for the 3rd wave interview. The resulting change in GDP per capita is going to be the log difference between the 
two waves. To be consistent, I recalculate the exchange rate shock measures in the same way for these sets of 
regressions but note that this introduces some amount of measurement error. 
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changes proxying for the exchange rate shocks, if anything.13 It appears that including 
price changes in the regression takes away useful variation in the exchange rate shock 
while not essentially affecting the return decision, which makes the coefficient estimate 
imprecise. 
 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
 The previous analysis relies on the assumption that exchange rate shocks during 
the Asian Financial Crisis were unexpected and exogenous; hence they roughly 
approximate a random allocation of shocks across different immigrant households in 
Australia. This motivates the claim that the estimates of 𝛽! presented above are causal 
effects. However, this may not hold if exchange rate shocks are systematically related to 
other factors that determine return for households. I have controlled for as many possible 
confounding factors in the analysis as the data permits. In the previous analysis, note that 
I discovered that richer countries, which had higher rates of return also had larger 
appreciations in their home country currency, hence inflating the supposed effects of 
exchange rates on return. After controlling for this though, the effect of exchange rate 
shocks remained significant and appears orthogonal to a host of other controls on country 
of origin, migrant and household characteristics. But there may still be remaining 
concerns and I explore them in detail in this section. 
 
Table 7: The Effect of Future Exchange Rate Shocks on Permanent Return Migration in the Prior Period 
 
Return from 
wave 1 – 
wave 2 
 
Return from 
wave 2 – 
wave 3 
    
ΔlnERATEwave2 –wave3 -0.0057 ΔlnERATEwave3 – 2yrs after -0.0139 
 (0.0081)  (0.0128) 
    
Country of Origin controls Y Country of Origin controls Y 
Household controls Y Household controls Y 
Individual Migrant Controls Y Individual Migrant controls Y 
N 3535 N 3069 
R2 0.005 R2 0.025 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
For the left panel: Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” for 
wave 2 (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). The exchange rate change is the change in the exchange rate from wave 2 
to wave 3 of the survey. 
For the right panel: Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” for 
wave 3 (assumed here to have returned to country of origin). The exchange rate change is the change in the exchange rate from wave 3 
to two years after the survey. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon 
admission, state of residence, average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In fact, when I re-estimate this regression using my more precise measure of the exchange rate shock that occurred exactly between 
interview dates from wave 2 to 3, the coefficient on the exchange rate shock is statistically significant and the same from column 1 
even when including the change in the CPI as a control. 
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 One potential violation of the identification assumption may be that future 
exchange rate shocks are in some way systematically related to past migration trends so 
the effect merely captures pre-existing trends. For instance, migrants who were faced 
with appreciations in their home currencies and returned could have simply belonged to 
those nationalities in the past, which had a higher propensity to return. I conduct two tests 
to address this concern. First, I run a placebo test where I regress future exchange rate 
shocks on past return migration. Future exchange rate shocks should not systematically 
predict return migration in the previous period. Second, I estimate the regression equation 
(2) adding lagged values for previous exchange rate shocks. This verifies that the 
exchange rate shocks during the Asian Financial crisis do not merely reflect past trends or 
is due to some regression to the mean. 
 
 Table 7 presents the falsification exercise. On the left panel, I regress the 
exchange rate shocks from the Asian financial crisis on the return indicator for a past 
period, particularly from wave 1 to wave 2 of the survey. Similarly, on the right panel, I 
regress the return variable from wave 2 to wave 3 on the future exchange rate shock 
calculated from wave 3 to 2 years after. In both cases, I cannot reject the null that future 
exchange rate shocks predict past return. 
 
Table 8: Are the Effect of Exchange Rate Shocks Contemporaneous? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ΔlnERATE -0.0516* -0.0521* -0.0518* -0.0565* -0.0529* 
 (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0284) (0.0316) 
      
ΔlnERATElag1  0.0108 0.00895   
  (0.0490) (0.0498)   
ΔlnERATElag2   0.0120   
   (0.0236)   
ΔlnERATElag10yr    0.00285  
    (0.00313)  
ΔlnERATEfuture     -0.00439 
     (0.0167) 
      
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2681 2681 2681 2598 2598 
R2 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.029 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is a dummy indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” (assumed here to have returned to 
country of origin). 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, highest educational attainment, household size, marital status, type of visa upon 
admission, state of residence, average weekly income and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated. 
 
 Table 8 presents the results when I account for lagged exchange rate shock 
variables. These variables are always computed using 2-year changes in the exchange 
rate in order to conform to the exchange rate shock measured between wave 2 and 3, 
which are typically 2-year changes. Column 1 provides the baseline result from table 4 
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again for comparison. I restrict the sample to those with observations for a lagged period 
and two lagged periods of the exchange rate shock to achieve consistency with the 
subsequent two columns. Columns 2 and 3 include these lagged variables as regressors. 
The point estimate for the coefficient of ΔlnERATE is unchanged in both. In column 4, I 
run a regression controlling for the long-term trend in country exchange rates, the change 
in exchange rates for the past 10 years. In column 5, I control for a future exchange rate 
shock, measured as the change 2 years after the last year of interview. These do not 
change the baseline result significantly. These regressions show that the effect of 
exchange rates does not merely reflect past trends; it appears that it is contemporaneous 
exchange rate shocks that influences return migration. In some way, this validates the 
focus on the period prior to and after the Asian Financial Crisis. It is during this window 
that shifts in the exchange rate appear to be unrelated to past trends, hence likely to be 
exogenous to migrants who were faced with them. 
 
 A second concern is that outliers may be driving the results. Recall, certain 
countries had their currencies depreciate by as much as 100% during the period vis-à-vis 
the Australian dollar. Table 9 depicts what happens to the main regression when extreme 
observations are systematically dropped from the data. Column 1 again uses the full 
sample. Column 2 drops the migrants from the top 3 countries with the most extreme 
currency depreciations (Bulgaria, Turkey, and Romania) and column 3 drops the top 5 
(adding Nigeria and Venezuela to the top 3). Column 4 drops migrants who obtained 
above the 99th percentile of the exchange rate shock variable while columns 5 and 6 trim 
those above the 95th and 90th percentile respectively14. In all six cases, the effect of the 
exchange rate shock remains negative and significant with some evidence that trimming 
for extreme values even magnifies the effect. This should appease fears that outliers are 
driving the result. 
 
Table 9: The Effect of Exchange Rate Shocks on Permanent Return Migration for the Trimmed Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample 
w/o top 3 
extreme 
w/o top 5 
extreme 
trim 99th 
percentile 
trim 95th 
percentile 
trim 90th 
percentile 
       
ΔlnERATE -0.0373*** -0.0513** -0.0518** -0.0437*** -0.0842*** -0.104** 
 (0.0104) (0.0207) (0.0231) (0.0130) (0.0272) (0.0414) 
       
       
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3069 2963 2948 3036 2915 2768 
R2 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.027 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating if the individual is reported to be “overseas permanently” (assumed here to have 
returned to country of origin). 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, 
average weekly income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The 99th percentile exchange rate shock is 1.2; the 95th percentile is 0.73; and the 90th percentile is 0.29. 
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 A third concern involves measurement error. The dependent variable, return, 
relies on information from a friend or relative of the migrant that he or she returned 
“overseas permanently.” There are conceivable ways in which this report might be 
inaccurate. “Overseas permanently” could reflect other reasons for attrition that the 
relative was unaware of. It may also capture instances of migrants being overseas only 
for some temporary trip or moving permanently to another country. Because return is a 
dependent variable though, it is worth noting that measurement error, in which return is 
randomly misreported in a way unrelated to exchange rate shocks, is less of a concern 
since this merely introduces noise and OLS coefficient estimates remain consistent in this 
case. What would bias results are instances in which the error in measuring return is 
systematically related to the exchange rate shocks. 
 
 In the analysis, “overseas permanently” was interpreted to mean return home but 
could also mean that the migrant moved to another country permanently. To be a threat to 
identification though, it must be that permanently migrating to other countries is 
somehow systematically determined by home country exchange rates. I cannot fully rule 
out this possibility yet it is improbable that this could yield the estimates that I find. For 
this explanation to fully account for the results, for example, those who moved to another 
country should also have had larger appreciations in the currency of their place origin 
than those who did not move. This is quite unlikely on two counts. One, almost zero 
percent of respondents in wave 2 said that they “expect to immigrate to another country 
[aside from their former country] in the future.” The response to this question is tabulated 
in table 10. Even dropping these individuals in the analysis has no effect on the results. 
Second, the fact that the exchange rate shocks had the most effect on those who said they 
intend to return to their home country during the baseline makes it improbable that 
migrants were moving elsewhere. Thus, while “overseas permanently” perhaps captures 
movement to other countries as well, this measurement error most realistically introduces 
itself as random noise. The fact that the regressions are still able to measure the parameter 
of interest with statistical significance suggests this is not a huge concern. 
 
Table 10: Expect to Emigrate to Another Country? 
 Freq. Percent 
Yes 28 0.91 
No 2699 87.94 
Not Sure 213 6.94 
[Expect to immigrate 
to former country] 129 4.20 
 
 Another possibility is that measurement error arising from other reasons for 
sample attrition listed in table 3 is driving the results. It may, for instance, coincidentally 
happen that those who were noted as “unable to track” contain those who have left for 
home permanently, in a way also related to the exchange rate shocks. At the same time, 
migrants traveling home could be systematically mistaken as permanent returnees when 
they are in fact merely visiting.  
 
 There is little evidence, however, that exchange rate shocks are related to any of 
these other reasons for attrition. Table 11 presents such an exercise where I regress each 
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of these other reasons for attrition on the exchange rate shock. Only “out of scope” 
appears to be predicted by the exchange rate shocks with marginal statistical significance, 
and even then the association is virtually zero. Further, if I redo the analysis and expand 
the definition of return migration to include “overseas temporary” instead of just 
“overseas permanently,” the results are qualitatively unchanged. I do not show these 
results in the paper but they are available upon request. 
 
Table 11: The correlation between the attrition variables and the exchange rate shocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unable to Track Refused 
Overseas 
Temporarily 
Out of 
Scope Deceased Other 
       
ΔlnERATE 0.0085 0.0054 -0.0117 0.0078* -0.0009 0.0131 
 (0.0131) (0.0113) (0.0170) (0.0047) (0.0006) (0.0089) 
       
Country of Origin controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual Migrant controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 
R2 0.022 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country of origin level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Exchange rates are in terms of foreign currency per Australian dollar. 
Country of origin controls include indicators for common language and colonial relationship with Australia, the log distance from 
Australia, and an indicator for whether the country was one of the countries hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Household and immigrant controls include age, sex, education level, household size, marital status, type of visa upon admission, 
average weekly income in the earlier wave and Australian dollar value of funds arrived with when first immigrated 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The United Nations estimates that more than 215 million people (around 3% of 
the world’s population) live outside their countries of birth, 171.6 million of which 
originate from developing countries. Economists are just starting to understand and 
investigate how this growing group continues to relate to the countries where they are 
born and from. Most studies tend to focus on the massive amounts of remittances these 
migrants send home. But return is another potentially important aspect and it is less well 
understood. 
 
 Migrant sending countries favor return migration because it is often thought to 
facilitate the development process by allowing returnees to invest their accumulated 
savings overseas in the home country, or by making their newly acquired skills, 
knowledge, and connections from working abroad available in the domestic economy. 
How can governments encourage return and maximize potential gains from such events? 
The design of optimal policy depends crucially on understanding the precise motivations 
for return. Target earners benefit most from expanding credit markets. For example, loans 
at subsidized rates may facilitate the start up of local businesses.15 On the other hand, 
such policies may be ineffective for life-cycle migrants. Governments may probably do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  An example of such a program is the 2 billion-peso reintegration fund that the Philippines offers to its return migrants as subsidized 
loans to start a business. 
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better for these types by identifying their preferences for consumption and promoting 
them. 
 
 In this paper, I examined the motivations for return of permanent migrants in 
Australia. These individuals are relatively well educated and for the most part have their 
entire families with them abroad. Despite this, I found that they continue to be influenced 
by home country factors in their decision to return home. In particular, a 10% decline in 
their home country exchange rate increases their likelihood of return in a two-year period 
by 0.37 percentage points. This explains almost 10% of the mean return rate during the 
period. This is comparable, yet slightly smaller, to what Yang (2006) finds for temporary 
workers abroad from the Philippines where the effect of exchange rates is a fifth of the 
return rate in a 12-month period. This is consistent with a lifecycle model of migration 
where the individual is mostly concerned about consumption rather than investment at 
home. It also appears that this consumption motive outweighs the consideration for 
employment opportunities at home. While this does not conclusively rule out the 
possibility that return migrants aid the development of their home countries substantially, 
this is evidence that the primary channel is probably not through business activity, at least 
for this group of mostly skilled and educated individuals from Australia. 
 
 Looking at subgroups, I found that those with predetermined expectations to 
migrate in the future are the most affected by exchange rate shocks, followed by those 
who were unsure. This is suggestive evidence that migrants mostly time their return to 
favorable conditions, but are also persuaded on the extensive margin. Unsurprisingly, 
those who have stated no intention of return beforehand do not seem to react to exchange 
rate shocks at all. 
 
 In the end, it is worth noting that return migration is an important but also small 
picture of the economic lives of immigrants; further research is needed in understanding 
what influences other aspects of migrant behavior and how this continues or ceases to be 
tied to home country factors. A recent paper in this area is Nekoei (2013) who considers 
how the earnings and labor supply of US immigrants are affected in real time by their 
home country exchange rates. Other fruitful areas to investigate would be economic 
decisions such savings and expenditures of workers that may be affected by exchange 
rate and other home country shocks. The endeavor would ultimately generate a better 
picture of what motivates international migrants since return migration is unlikely to be 
decided in isolation to these other equally important economic variables. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Comparative Statics for the optimization of the Life-cycle migrant 
 
The optimization problem can be reduced to 
 max!!  !!  ! 𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) 𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑡𝐸𝑐! + 1− 𝑡 𝑐! = 𝑡𝐸𝑤! + 1− 𝑡 𝑤!                                                            (1) 
 
The first order conditions of the Lagrangian are provided by the following equations: 
 𝑢! 𝑐! − 𝑢! 𝑐! + 𝜆 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! = 0                                                        (2)  𝑢!! 𝑐! = 𝐸𝜆                                                                                                                                                                                              (3) 𝑢!! 𝑐! = 𝜆                                                                                                                                                                                                  (4) −𝑡 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! + 𝑐! − 𝑤! = 0                                                                                 5                                
 
Taking the total derivative of (2) and (5) yields 
 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! 𝑑𝜆 = −𝐸𝜆𝑑𝑤! + 𝜆𝑑𝑤! − 𝜆 𝑤! − 𝑐! 𝑑𝐸                                                                                                                                        (6) − 𝐸𝑤! − 𝑤! + 𝑐! − 𝐸𝑐! 𝑑𝑡 = −𝑡𝐸 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆 − 1 − 𝑡 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆 𝑑𝜆 + 𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑤! + 1 − 𝑡 𝑑𝑤! + 𝑡 𝑤! − 𝑐! − 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝐸 𝑑𝐸                  (7) 
 
Define 𝑎 =  − 𝐸𝑤𝑓 − 𝑤𝑛 + 𝑐𝑛 − 𝐸𝑐𝑓  and 𝑏 = 𝑡𝐸 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆 + 1 − 𝑡 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆  then if we let 𝑑𝑤! =𝑑𝑤! = 0 and substituting (6) into (7), the resulting equation is 
 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝐸 = 𝑤! − 𝑐! − 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝐸 −𝑏𝜆 + 𝑎𝑡𝑎!                       (8) 
 𝑎 ≤ 0  because the migrant cannot consume more than her foreign wages abroad (𝑤! ≥ 𝑐!) and consumption at home must at least equal to wages and savings from 
abroad (𝑐! ≥ 𝑤!). At the same time, 𝑏 < 0 because it can be shown that both 𝜕𝑐𝑓𝜕𝜆  and 𝜕𝑐ℎ𝜕𝜆  
are negative from the first order conditions (3) and (4). 
 
 
A2: Comparative Statics for the optimization of the Target earner 
 
The optimization problem can be reduced to  
 max!!  !!  ! 𝑡𝑢!(𝑐!)+ 1− 𝑡 𝑢!(𝑐!) 𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑡𝑐! + 𝑆! = 𝑡𝑤!                                                                                              (9) 1− 𝑡 𝑐! = 1− 𝑡 𝑦 + 𝐸𝑆! − 𝐶                                              (10) 
 
From (5) and (6), it is easy to solve for optimal 𝑐! and 𝑐!. 
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𝑐! = 𝑤! −    𝐶𝐸𝑡 𝑐! = 𝑦 
 
Plugging these values into the objective function and taking the first order condition 
produces 
 𝑢!! 𝑤! − 𝐶𝐸𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑢! 𝑤! − 𝐶𝐸𝑡 − 𝑢! 𝑦 = 0                      (11) 
 
It follows that  
 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝐸 = − 𝑡𝐸                                                                   (12) 
